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Introduction
Privacy issues have a rather long history. 
The photo camera, introduced at the end 
of the 19th century, was the first revolu-
tionary observation and identification 
tool that threatened the privacy of an in-
dividual. Since then, several other tools 
have become widespread, including: vi-
deo cameras, credit cards, Web browsers, 
and mobile phones. These tools reveal 
our presence and habits in various sphe-
res of life, as well as our communication 
and mobility patterns [1].  DNA sequen-
cing greatly exacerbates this problem, as 
the genome represents our ultimate bio-
logical identity. By combining genomic 
data with information about a person's 
environment or lifestyle, it is possible (to 
some extent) to infer that individual's 
phenotype.
The genomic era began in April 2003, 
when the Human Genome Project 
was declared complete. Since then, as 
a result of the impressive decrease in 
genome-sequencing costs and the ra-
pid development of new-generation 
sequencing technologies, medicine has 
been undergoing a genomic revolution. 
It is not unrealistic to believe that, in a 
near future, most individuals will have 
their genomes sequenced. Thus, they 
will be able to benefit from preventive 
diagnoses and treatments tailored to 
their genetic makeup. Even though the 
understanding of the complex relation 
between genome and health is still su-
perficial and much more progress has 
to be made in biomedical research, it is 
now possible to collect, store, process 
and share genomic data in a way that 
was unthinkable a decade ago. However, 
the rise in availability, use, and sharing 
of such information raises many serious 
ethical and privacy concerns.
In general, access to genomic data 
prompts some important privacy con-
cerns: (i)  DNA reflects information 
about genetic conditions and predis-
positions to specific diseases such as 
Alzheimer's, cancer, or schizophrenia, 
(ii)  DNA contains information about 
ancestors, siblings, and progeny, (iii) 
 DNA (almost) does not change over 
time, hence revoking or replacing it 
(as with other forms of identification) 
is impossible, and (iv)  DNA analysis is 
already being used both in law enforce-
ment and healthcare, thus prompting 
numerous ethical issues. Furthermore, it 
is hard to assess or estimate the extent of 
the personal information that could be 
extracted or derived from the genome in 
the future.
Traditional approaches to privacy, such 
as de-identification or aggregation [2], 
are ineffective in the genomic context 
because the genome itself is the ultimate 
identifier [3]. For instance, a recent stu-
dy by Gymrek et al. [4], published in Sci-
ence, demonstrates the feasibility of re-
identifying  DNA donors from a public 
research database by using information 
available from popular genealogy Web-
sites.
In this article, we first focus on the cur-
rent uses of genomic data and the pos-
sible privacy threats. We then describe 
some of the techniques recently desig-
ned to protect the genomic data.
Abbreviations used in the article:
 DNA  Deoxyribonucleic acid
 DTC  Direct-to-Consumer
 EHR  Electronic Health Record
 OSN  Online Social Network
 PET  Privacy-Enhancing Technology
 SPU  Storage and Processing Unit
 WGS  Whole Genome Sequencing
Abstract
According to many scientists and cli-
nicians, genomics is taking on a key 
role in the field of medicine. Impres-
sive advances in genome sequencing 
have opened the way to a variety of 
revolutionary applications in modern 
healthcare. In particular, the increasing 
understanding of the human genome, 
and of its relation to diseases and re-
sponse to treatments brings promise 
of improvements in better preventive 
and personalized medicine. However, 
this progress raises important privacy 
and ethical concerns that need to be 
addressed. Indeed, each genome is the 
ultimate identifier of its owner and, 
due to its nature, it contains highly 
personal and privacy-sensitive data. In 
this article, after summarizing recent 
advances in genomics, we discuss some 
important privacy issues associated 
with human genomic information and 
methods put in place to address them.
Key words: genome – privacy – infor-
mation security – cryptography – an-
onymization
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Uses of genomic data and 
potential threats
The  DNA sequence of an individual is 
composed by over 3 billion base pairs 
distributed along 23 pairs of chromoso-
mes. Most of the  DNA sequence is con-
served across the whole human popu-
lation and it is estimated that no more 
than 0,5% of the  DNA differs between 
any two individuals [5]. Yet, it is these 
differences that influence an individual's 
health status and other aspects. In re-
cent years, the use of genomic data has 
increased dramatically. Its applications 
can be grouped in four main areas: 
healthcare, genomic research, direct-to-
consumer services, and legal and foren-
sic genomics.
Healthcare
It has been proved that mutations in an 
individual's genomic makeup can influ-
ence his or her health status. In particu-
lar, genetic variations can be associated 
with change in the susceptibility to a 
certain disease and in the response to a 
pharmaceutical agent. Thus, early diag-
nosis and treatment can be tailored to an 
individual's genetic makeup [6]. Examp-
les of Swiss initiatives in the digitization 
process of health records are monDos-
sierMedical.ch [7] and healthbank.ch [8].
Genomic Research
On a weekly basis, researchers discover 
new associations between the genome 
and a number of disorders and variable 
responses to treatments. The dramatic 
decrease in the cost of genome sequen-
cing has made it increasingly possible to 
collect, store, and computationally ana-
lyze genomic sequencing data on a fine-
grained level, as well as over populations 
on the order of millions [9].
Direct-to-Consumer Services ( DTC)
Until recently, genome sequencing was 
a complex and expensive process, hence 
a prerogative of only large research la-
boratories or diagnostic centers. But, in 
the past few years, there has been a rise in 
 DTC services for medical data in general, 
and genomic data in particular. These 
services have made it affordable for in-
dividuals to become directly involved in 
the collection, processing, and even ana-
lysis of their medical and genomic data. 
Some well-known examples are 23and-
Me [10] and Counsyl [11] that provide 
their customers with reports, based on 
their genotype, about the risk of develo-
ping certain diseases.
Legal and Forensic Genomics
Given that genomic data has a static 
nature and uniquely identifies an indi-
vidual, this information is used also for 
investigative purposes.
Although the widespread availability 
and use of genomic information is an 
outstanding opportunity for medicine, 
the impact on privacy is unprecedented 
[1]. Of course, tight legislation regulates 
the activities of companies and hospitals 
that perform  DNA sequencing and store 
genomic data, but it is difficult to protect 
them against the misdeeds of a hacker or 
a disgruntled employee.
The leakage of genomic information can 
pave the way to a variety of abuses and 
threats. For example, health insurance 
companies could obtain the genetic in-
formation of their customers and deny 
their services to people with a high sus-
ceptibility of developing a chronic dis-
ease, or employers could hire applicants 
based on their genetic features. Access to 
this information could engender genetic 
discrimination as depicted by the popu-
lar sci-fi movie of 1997 « GATTACA». In 
addition, a medical institution aiming at 
setting up a medical study on genomic 
data could be severely discredited if par-
ticipants' genomic information were 
leaked or compromised.
Furthermore, integration of genomic 
data with other privacy-sensitive data 
(e. g. location, ancestry and other online 
social network –  OSN – data) increases 
privacy risk through the potential for 
cross-layer attacks.
Techniques from 
 Information security to 
 protect  genomic data
Information security is the practice of 
protecting information from unauthor-
ized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, inspection, recording, or 
destruction [12]. Traditionally, informa-
tion security has been widely used by 
governmental, military, and financial in-
stitutions. Only in the last few years has 
the field of information security grown 
and evolved significantly also in the 
medical context.
Tools protecting informational privacy 
by eliminating or minimizing personal 
data without the loss of the functional-
ity of the information system are usually 
called privacy-enhancing technologies 
( PET) [13].  PET generally protect us-
ers' privacy by either breaking the link 
between individuals' identities and the 
data they provide (e. g., removing user's 
identities from published data), or by 
decreasing the amount of provided in-
formation (e. g., by using cryptographic 
tools or obfuscation techniques).
The idea of using technical solutions to 
guarantee the privacy of genomic data 
raises interesting debates. On one hand, 
the potential of genomic data for man-
kind is tremendous. Privacy-enhancing 
technologies can be considered as an 
obstacle to achieve these goals. On the 
other hand, to expedite advances in per-
sonalized medicine, genome-phenome 
association studies often require the par-
ticipation of a large number of research 
participants. To encourage individuals 
to enroll in such studies, it is crucial to 
adhere to ethical principles, such as au-
tonomy, reciprocity and, more gener-
ally, trust (e. g., guarantee that genomic 
data will not be misused). Technologi-
cal solutions for genome privacy can be 
achieved by various techniques, such as 
Author's personal copy (e-oﬀprint)
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access control, cryptography, anonymi-
zation, or obfuscation.
Access control is the selective restric-
tion of access to sensitive information 
by authorized people, whereas cryptog-
raphy transforms usable information 
into a form that renders it unusable by 
anyone not having the decryption key. 
In modern cryptography, the distinction 
is made between symmetric encryp-
tion (e. g., for the encryption of files) 
(Fig. 1a), and (ii) asymmetric encryp-
tion (e. g., for digital signatures, for ex-
ample to guarantee the authenticity of a 
piece of code) (Fig. 1b). Homomorphic 
encryption (Fig. 1c) is a special case of 
asymmetric cryptography.
Anonymization and obfuscation are two 
different privacy-preserving techniques. 
On one hand, anonymization is the pro-
cess of removing tracks, or the electron-
ic trail, on the data that would lead an 
eavesdropper to its origins, whereas on 
the other hand obfuscation deliberately 
muddles the data in order to prevent 
an attacker from interpreting it. Some 
examples of anonymization are k-ano-
nymity and l-diversity (Fig. 2).
Cryptographic techniques typically re-
duce the efficiency of the algorithms, 
introducing storage and computational 
overhead, while preventing the users 
from «viewing» the data. Obfuscation-
based methods reduce the accuracy (or 
utility) of genomic data. Therefore, es-
pecially when human life is at stake, us-
ing such privacy-enhancing techniques 
for genomic data can be delicate.
We need techniques that guarantee the 
security and privacy of genomic data, 
without significantly degrading the ef-
ficiency of the use of genomic data in re-
search and healthcare. Developing  PETs 
for genomic data presents challenges 
due to the architecture of the human ge-
Fig. 1: a) Symmetric encryption: The same key is shared between the Sender and the Receiver and it is used to encrypt and decrypt the message. 
b) Asymmetric encryption: Different keys are used to encrypt and decrypt the message. The Receiver (R) is provided with a pair of keys composed 
by a Public Key and a Private Key. The Sender uses R's Public Key to encrypt the plaintext and R uses his Private key to decrypt. c) Homomorphic 
 encryption is a form of encryption that allows specific computations on the ciphertext domain. For example, (i) the product of two ciphertexts is 
equal to the encryption of the sum of their corresponding plaintexts, and (ii) a ciphertext raised to a constant number is equal to the encryption of 
the product of the corresponding plaintext and the constant.
Author's personal copy (e-oﬀprint)
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nome and to the fast evolving knowledge 
in the field of genomics.
Existing works for genome 
protection
A first example (Fig. 3) of genome pro-
tection is the protection of genomic pri-
vacy in medical tests and personalized 
medicine. In particular, in our research 
effort [14,15], we focus on genetic dis-
ease susceptibility tests by developing 
a new architecture between the patient 
and the medical unit. We make use of 
homomorphic encryption and proxy 
re-encryption, and propose a privacy-
preserving disease susceptibility test. 
Assuming the whole genome sequenc-
ing ( WGS) to be done by a certified in-
stitution, we propose to store patients' 
genomic data encrypted at a «storage 
and processing unit» ( SPU). Our ar-
chitecture, while preserving the privacy 
of patients' genomic data, enables the 
medical unit to retrieve the encrypted 
genomic data from the  SPU and pro-
cess it for medical tests and personalized 
medicine methods.
The second system (Fig. 4) that we pro-
pose [16] is meant to protect the privacy 
of aligned, raw genomic data. Geneti-
cists usually prefer to store this particu-
lar format of genomic data in addition 
to individuals' variation profiles (com-
pact and summarized form of the raw 
data already protected in the previous 
framework), mainly because of the im-
maturity of bioinformatics algorithms 
and sequencing platforms. The raw 
genomic data of a patient includes mil-
Fig. 2: Example of anonymization: In (a), the original table has been modified to fulfill k-anonymity: each released record is now indistinguishable 
from at least (k-1) others on its quasi-identifier attributes (in this case the zip code, age, and nationality). The table is further anonymized in (b), to 
fulfill l-diversity: each group of tuples sharing the same quasi-identifier must have at least l distinct sensitive values which are roughly of equal 
proportions. For example, if an attacker knows that a given patient, aged 46, is in the database, neither from table (a) nor from table (b) can he 
figure out the clinical condition of the patient. However, if that patient is 36, from (a) the attacker can guess the patient has Alzheimer's, whereas 
no conclusion can be drawn from (b).
Fig. 3: Proposed solution: (0) The cryptographic keys (public and secret keys) are generated 
and distributed to the patients; (1) Patient (P) provides his sample (e. g., his saliva) to a certified 
institution (CI) for  DNA extraction and sequencing; (2) After the sequencing, the CI encrypts 
P's  genetic variants with its public key; (3) CI send the encrypted variants to the storage and 
 processing unit ( SPU); (4) P sends part of his secret key to  SPU; (5) P asks to the medical center 
(MC) to check his susceptibility for a certain disease X and sends the remaining part of his secret 
key; (6) MC sends to  SPU the markers identifiers related to disease X and their contribution 
(a genetic markers can influence the risk for a disease in different ways); (7)  SPU, through homo-
morphic operations, computes the encrypted susceptibility and partially decrypts the result with 
its part of the secret key; (8) The partially decrypted end-result is sent back to the MC which per-
forms the final decryption and gets the plaintext end-result. Even if the MC is a malicious party, 
it can only see the final result of the computation and can infer nothing about P's genome.
Author's personal copy (e-oﬀprint)
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lions of short reads of 100 to 400 nucleo-
tides. Our proposed scheme stores these 
short reads at a biobank in encrypted 
form and enables a medical unit to pri-
vately retrieve a subset of the short reads 
of the patients without revealing the na-
ture of the genetic test to the biobank. 
Furthermore, this architecture enables 
the biobank to mask particular parts of 
the retrieved short reads if (i) some parts 
of the provided short reads are out of the 
requested range, or (ii) the patient does 
not give consent to some parts of the 
provided short reads (e. g., parts reveal-
ing sensitive diseases) (Fig. 5).
Several other research groups have 
tackled various aspects of genome priva-
cy, including (i) private string searching 
and comparison on the  DNA sequence 
[17,18], (ii) private release of aggregate 
data [19–21], and (iii) private clinical ge-
nomics [22]. More generally, the protec-
tion of medical data has been very actively 
addressed by researchers. Many ad-hoc 
electronic health record ( EHR) systems 
use cryptographic protocols to store me-
dical information in a secure fashion and 
to define the access rights of the medical 
units [23,24]. Yet, research in the genomic 
privacy field is still in its infancy.
Kin genomic privacy
Another important aspect of geno-
mic privacy is kin privacy. Even if one 
person's genome is not disclosed, a fa-
mily member's genome can leak signi-
ficant information about that person. 
Some believe that they have nothing to 
hide about their genetic structure; hence 
they might decide to give full consent 
for the publication of their genomes on 
the Internet to help genomic research. 
However, our  DNA sequences are high-
ly correlated to our relatives' sequences. 
Consequently, a person revealing his ge-
nome not only damages his own geno-
mic privacy, but also puts his relatives' 
privacy at risk [25]. Currently, people do 
not need consent from their relatives to 
share their genome online.
Recently, our research group has provi-
ded a method to estimate the genome 
privacy loss of an individual when the 
genomes of some of his or her relatives 
are publicly available [26].
Conclusion
Genome sequencing is an emerging phe-
nomenon and, as it is radically novel, it 
brings both great medical opportuni-
ties and significant privacy concerns. 
Genomic data will be increasingly avail-
able on the Internet, especially in citizen-
contributed environments, (e. g., online 
social networks). Sharing this extremely 
sensitive data will raise unprecedented 
privacy concerns, because the extent of 
the information that can be revealed by 
a genome and how it could be used is yet 
unknown.
Fig. 4: a) Flow of the genomic data from the biological sample to the fully digitized genome. 
b) Schema of the proposed framework:  SAM files are stored in an encrypted fashion at the 
Biobank by using pseudonyms; Medical Units (MU) need to be approved institutions in order to 
request ranges of nucleotides; the cryptographic keys of the patients are stored at the Masking 
and Key Manager (MK).
Author's personal copy (e-oﬀprint)
PRAXIS Mini-Review  Praxis 2014; 103 (10): 579 – 586  584
Therefore, there is a clear need to sup-
port personalized medicine, genome 
research, forensic investigation, and 
direct-to-consumer genomics, while re-
specting privacy. Information security 
techniques will play an instrumental role 
in this process. An extensive overview 
of our research endeavors is accessible 
through our Web site [27] and, recently, 
a community platform [28] has also 
been developed for sharing information 
about the protection of genomic privacy.
It is important, however, to observe that 
technical solutions are often not suf-
ficient for protecting genomic privacy, 
therefore legal and professional guide-
lines are needed to govern how genomic 
information is transmitted, stored and 
processed by the different stakeholders.
Mitigating privacy issues will require 
long-term collaboration among geneti-
cists, other healthcare providers, ethi-
cists, lawmakers, and computer scien-
tists.
Fig. 5: The masking technique: Preventing the leakage of extra information in the short read (SR) 
to the MU by masking the positions of the SR external to the requested range and «non-consen-
ted» nucleotides by the patient. The encrypted SR are masked at the biobank.
Key messages
  Impressive advances in genome sequencing have paved the way to a variety of 
revolutionary applications in modern healthcare.
  However, because of the genome‘s highly sensitive nature, this progress raises 
important privacy and ethical concerns that need to be addressed.
  Therefore, there is a clear need to support personalized medicine, genome 
research, forensic investigation, and direct-to-consumer genomics, while 
respecting privacy. Information security techniques will play an instrumental 
role in this process.
  Yet, it is important to observe that technical solutions are often not enough 
for protecting genomic privacy, therefore legal and professional guidelines 
are needed to govern how genomic information is handled by the different 
stakeholders.
Key messages
  Eindrückliche Fortschritte in der Genom-Sequenzierung haben den Weg für 
viele bahnbrechende Anwendungen in der modernen Medizin geebnet.
  Weil das Genom sehr sensitive Informationen über dessen Besitzer enthält, 
müssen auch Bedenken bezüglich Ethik und Datenschutz Rechnung getragen 
werden.
  Personalisierte Medizin, Genom-Forschung, forensische Forschung sowie die 
Direct-to-Consumer-Genomik sind zu unterstützen, Datenschutz und Privat-
sphäre müssen jedoch gewahrt sein. Techniken für Informationssischerheit 
werden in diesem Feld eine grössere Rolle spielen.
  Die technischen Lösungen sind jedoch häufig nicht ausreichend, um die 
«Genom-Privacy» zu gewährleisten. Deshalb braucht es für alle Beteilgten 
rechtliche und fachliche Guidelines für den Umgang mit genomischen Infor-
mationen.
Zusammenfassung
Vielen Wissenschaftlern und Medizi-
nern zufolge wird die Genomik auch in 
Zukunft eine grosse Rolle in der Medi-
zin spielen. Eindrückliche Fortschritte 
im Bereich der Genom-Sequenzierung 
haben den Weg für bahnbrechende 
Anwendungen in der modernen Me-
dizin geebnet. Besonders das wachsen-
de Verständnis über das menschliche 
Genom und dessen Zusammenspiel 
mit Krankheiten und Therapieanspre-
chen versprechen Verbesserungen für 
die Prävention und die personalisier-
te Medizin. Damit treten jedoch auch 
ethische Bedenken und Fragen bezüg-
lich Privatsphäre bzw. Datenschutz 
auf den Plan. Denn jedes Genom ist 
ein Identifikator seines Besitzers und 
enthält daher sehr persönliche und 
Privatsphäre-sensitive Daten. Dieser 
Artikel beleuchtet wichtige Themen 
und Methoden bezüglich Privatsphäre 
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und Datenschutz im Zusammenhang 
mit Genomdaten.
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Résumé
Selon l'avis de beaucoup de scienti-
fiques et de cliniciens la génomique 
est appelé à jouer un rôle clé dans le 
domaine de la médecine. Des progrès 
impressionnants dans le séquençage du 
génome ont ouvert la voie à une variété 
d'applications révolutionnaires dans 
les soins de santé. En particulier, la 
compréhension croissante du génome 
humain, de sa relation aux maladies 
et la réponse aux traitements promet 
d'améliorer la médecine préventive et 
personnalisée. Néanmoins, ce progrès 
est source d'une inquiétude sur le plan 
éthique et de la protection des données, 
une inquiétude qui doit être discutée. 
En effet, chaque génome représente le 
moyen ultime d'identifier la personne 
dont il provient et, contient dès lors des 
données personnelles hautement sen-
sibles sur le plan privé. Dans cet article, 
après avoir résumé les progrès récents 
en génomique, nous allons discuter de 
quelques points importants concer-
nant la politique de confidentialité sur 
le plan de l'information génomique 
humaine, de même que des méthodes 
mises en place pour les gérer.
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